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A Response to "The Effectiveness of Proposed
Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries"
Craig W Conratht and Barry T. Freemantt
Is it a good idea or a bad idea for former communist countries, or
other economies in transition to market economies, to adopt antitrust
laws? A fierce debate over this question has raged among American
antitrust economists and lawyers.' In Central and Eastern Europe,
however, this question has hardly made a ripple 2 -it was quickly an-
swered in the affirmative.3 Yet, in the United States the debate contin-
ues.4 The latest contribution to this debate is from A.E. Rodriguez and
Mark D. Williams. 5 We believe that a careful analysis of their argu-
ments against antitrust enforcement may help explain why their side of
the debate has not received much acceptance in Central and Eastern
Europe or other economies in transition.
The value of antitrust enforcement has been questioned by some
who suggest that free trade alone will prevent the accumulation of
t Attorney, Antitrust Division, United States Department ofJustice. Advisor in the Po-
lish Antimonopoly Office, 1991-93. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors
and not necessarily those of the Department ofJustice.
tt Economist, Bureau of Economics, United States Federal Trade Commission. Advisor
in the Polish Antimonopoly Office, 1992-93. The opinions expressed herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the staff or the Commissioners of the Federal Trade
Commission.
I See Roger Boner &James Langenfeld, Liberal Trade and Antitrust in Developing Nations,
REG., Spring 1992, at 5; Paul E. Godek, One U.S. Export Eastern Europe Doesn't Need, RG., Win-
ter 1992, at 21; Paul E. Godek, Protecting Eastern Europe from Antitrust, REG., Fall 1992, at 4;
James Langenfeld & Marsha W. Blitzer, Is Competition Policy the Last Thing Central and Eastern
Europe Need? 6 Am. U.J. Irr'L L. & POL'Y 347 (1991);Janusz A. Ordover & Russell W. Pittman,
The Role of Antitrust in Eastern Europe, REG., Summer 1992, at 5.
2 For example, in Poland, the 1990 Antimonopoly Law passed the Sejm (the lower
house of the Polish parliament) by a vote of 197-21 (with 31 abstentions). The 1991 amend-
ments strengthening that law passed by 211-35 (with 18 abstentions).
3 From 1990 to late 1993, new antimonopoly laws were adopted in Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia (now in force in both the Czech Republic and Slovalda), Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. No former communist state or
new state, to our knowledge, has voted down a proposed antimonopoly law. Of particular
interest to the United States, Mexico has also enacted a new competition law.
4 This intriguing dichotomy may reveal more about American antitrust economists and
lawyers than about Central and Eastern European policy makers, but that is a question for
another article.
5 A.E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for
Developing Countrties, 19 N.C. J. Ir'L L. ,& CoM. REG. 209 (1993).
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market power.6 Previous observations of trade liberalization policies,
however, have not seen the expected increase in competition 7 as firms
most affected by tariff reductions lobby the government to impose
non-tariff barriers in order to continue to protect their markets from
competition; in other words, these firms engage in "rent-seeking" (at-
tempting to obtain monopoly profits). Thus, non-tariff barriers re-
place tariffs in protecting domestic competitors. According to
Rodriguez and Williams, the characteristics of the polity of the typical
developing or post-communist country mean that it is relatively easy
for domestic industries to obtain such government-mandated protec-
tion from competition.8
Rodriguez and Williams view the imposition of non-tariff barriers
as an alternative (or substitute) to cartelization as a means for firms to
protect themselves from competition. Antitrust enforcement, by rais-
ing the cost of cartelization, according to Rodriguez and Williams, in-
creases the amount of rent-seeking by affected groups. Thus,
Rodriguez and Williams claim, even if antitrust enforcement is success-
ful in raising the cost of cartelization, this success does not benefit con-
sumers because the affected firms will simply shift to rent-seeking in
the form of lobbying for non-tariff barriers. Competition agencies, the
authors allege, cannot prevent or limit such barriers through competi-
tion advocacy programs. Such programs, they argue, face large polit-
ical and bureaucratic hurdles. The implication of their analysis is that
antitrust laws and antitrust enforcement are wasteful because they are
not likely to increase competition (or reduce monopoly) in these econ-
omies in transition. 9
There are two main flaws in Rodriguez and Williams's analysis.
First, they make a fundamental analytical error by assuming that carte-
lization and trade barriers are substitutes for one another. In fact, they
are better viewed as complements; if firms have one, they still have
good reasons to desire the other. 10 Second, Rodriguez and Williams
are overly pessimistic about competition advocacy as a tool for limiting
the harm to consumers caused by government over-regulation. Com-
petition advocacy is not a perfect tool, but it can be useful.
In this paper, we first describe the phenomena of cartelization
6 See Godek, One U.S. Export Eastern Europe Doesn't Need, supra note 1.
7 Rodriguez & Williams, supra note 5, at 210 n.3.
8 Id. at 219.
9 Rodriguez and Williams do not offer any alternative as to how competition should be
created in these countries.
10 We use the terms complements and substitutes in a production setting rather than a
consumption setting. Hence, cartelization and trade barriers are complementary inputs into
the production of supracompetitive profits in the same manner that sunlight and rainfall are
complementary inputs for the production of crops. The marginal output from a given
amount of one of the inputs is increased when some of the other is used concurrently. Rod-
riguez and Williams view cartelization and trade barriers predominantly as alternative inputs
for obtaining supracompetitive profits.
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and import restrictions separately. Then we examine how they interact
and explain how this interaction demonstrates that they are better
viewed not as substitutes, but as complements. Subsequently, we
briefly comment on Rodriguez and Williams's critique of "competition
advocacy" programs.
I. Cartelization and Import Restrictions Are More Like
Complements than Substitutes
Rodriguez and Williams treat cartelization and import restrictions
as substitutes. They view the two as alternative sources of supracompe-
titive profits. A more careful analysis, however, shows the limitations of
this view. We begin by examining the profitability of trade restrictions
and of cartelization.
As economic phenomena, a trade barrier is a shift of a supply
curve, while cartelization is a movement along a supply curve. A do-
mestic industry is always better off if it can do both, rather than just
one or the other.1 1 In other words, if a domestic industry has trade
barriers, it can improve its profits by cartelizing. If a domestic industry
has a cartel, it can improve its position by obtaining trade barriers.
Let us examine why this is true.
A. Five Illustrative Cases
Consider an economy in transition, with relatively inefficient local
production. The product is produced both domestically and abroad.
Foreign producers have lower production costs.
Case 1: Open Competitive Market
Figure 1 shows the demand (D) curve for this industry. The de-
mand curve is downward sloping to reflect the fact that decreases in
price cause the quantity demanded to increase (if all else is equal).
Supply from both domestic producers and imports is referred to here
as international supply. The international industry supply curve, S',
shows the total quantity that would be supplied at a given price. This is
also shown in Figure 1.
I This assumes that the demand curve and supply curve have their normal slopes, i.e.,
are negatively and positively sloped, respectively.
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Figure 1
Open Competitive Market





In this fully competitive and open market, the competitive (equi-
librium) price and quantity, shown as P, and Q , are determined
where the supply and demand curves intersect. Consumers are
purchasing the product at the lowest possible price. At this competi-
tive price, some (or all) domestic producers may face losses, and they
must either make dramatic productivity improvements (that is, adopt a
competitive response) or go out of business. 12 Suppose instead that
these domestic producers try something other than a competitive re-
sponse; they may attempt to cartelize or to obtain rents through gov-
ernment trade restrictions. 13 We examine the effect of these non-
competitive responses, first individually and then together, on prices
and output in the industry.
12 If all firms in the industry, both foreign and domestic, had identical cost curves, then
no abnormal profits would be earned by the producers. Different cost structures would not
alter the results. In such a situation, the marginal supplier would earn zero abnormal profits
while other producers would earn abnormal returns because of their efficient production.
13 In order to isolate the effects of these phenomena, we will consider the hypothetical
cases in which a perfect cartel could be organized or in which completely effective import
restrictions could be imposed. We also do not consider the costs of implementing these
solutions. The basic operation of these phenomena does not change with typical realistic
changes to these conditions. See infra note 21 (discussing some of the implications of such
relaxations).
[VOL. 19
1994] ANTITRUST IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES-RESPONSE 237
Case 2: Closed Uncartelized Market
We will now consider what happens if the domestic industry ob-
tains import restrictions. What is the effect of trade barriers on domes-
tic producers, without cartelization?
Figure 2
Closed Uncartelized Market
(Import Restrictions, but No Cartel)
In Figure 2, the supply curve now encompasses only domestic sup-
ply, and is designated Sd. It has shifted to the left relative to S'. As a
result, less of the product will be supplied at any price. The equilib-
rium price increases from P, to Pd, while quantity supplied decreases
from Q, to Q. Hence, consumers are worse off. By contrast, domestic
producers are better off. They do not face low cost competition from
imports and thus can avoid difficult, even wrenching, decisions about
productivity improvements.
Case 3: Open Cartelized Market
Instead of obtaining import restrictions, assume the industry or-
ganizes a cartel. In this case, of course, the domestic producers would
be forced to convince their foreign competitors to participate in a car-
tel. Depending upon a variety of factors, this could or could not be
difficult. But if the industry does cartelize, then the results can be seen
by examining Figure 3.
Qd Q
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Figure 3
Open Cartelized Market




The members of the industry join a cartel that agrees to restrict
output. The cartel, acting as a collusive monopoly, will maximize its
profits by producing the quantity which equates the marginal revenue
(the additional industry revenue generated by selling one more unit of
output) and the marginal cost (the additional cost of producing that
unit of output). 14 As a result of cartelization, the price increases to the
monopoly price, Pm, and quantity decreases to Q,. Consumers are
worse off than in the competitive open market case. Society suffers a
deadweight loss in the form of inefficient allocation of resources. 15
Supracompetitive profits are earned by the producers in the industry,
as a whole. Domestic producers who are less efficient than the foreign
producers may not earn monopoly profits, but merely earn normal
profits (or smaller losses). Nonetheless, these relatively inefficient pro-
14 In this case, the marginal cost curve can be represented by the industry supply curve,
S'. The marginal revenue curve, shown as MR, reveals that, in order for the cartel to sell an
additional unit of output, price must be lowered for all output that the collusive monopoly
sells, i.e., the cartel is a price maker. The point where the marginal revenue and marginal
cost curves intersect indicates the quantity that is produced by the cartel; the demand curve
determines the price that will be charged for this quantity (the monopoly price).
15 See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
104 (1990). Cf. cjCHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 11-14 (1976)
(rent-seeking, as well as deadweight loss, must be considered among societal costs of
monopoly).
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ducers are better off than they would be without the cartel. Foreign
producers earn monopoly profits but must forego unlimited expansion
into the market. 16
Note that both import restrictions and cartelization lead to
supracompetitive profits. It is not clear, however, which would be pre-
ferred by the industry if they were forced to choose one or the other.
This choice would depend on several factors, including the elasticity of
demand, costs of production by domestic and foreign producers, and
the relative market share of imports.
We have described the competitive open market, the market with
import restrictions, and the market with a cartel. The next step is to
complicate the matter further. If import restrictions and cartelization
were really substitutes as Rodriguez and Williams imply,' 7 the effect of
adding cartelization to a market with import restrictions (or vice versa)
would be negligible.
Case 4: Closed Market That Is Cartelized
Imagine that import restrictions exist. Will it be in the interest of
domestic producers to form a cartel? If Rodriguez and Williams are
correct in suggesting that import restrictions and cartelization are sub-
stitutes, one would expect that the domestic producers would be indif-
ferent to forming a cartel. As they said, "Often, the gains to interest
groups of establishing cartels or price-fixing schemes are outweighed
by simply soliciting preferential treatment from the state. If potential
monopolists are uninterested in cartelizing, then the role of antitrust is
slight."' 8
As shown in Figure 4, however, the domestic industry normally will
be interested in cartelizing. Figure 4 shows the original international
supply curve, S', and the domestic supply curve, Sd, that exist after im-
port restrictions have been imposed. In short, the imposition of im-
port restrictions has shifted the supply curve to the left. Price and
quantity are Pd and Qd.
Suppose the members of the domestic industry now form a cartel
which agrees to restrict output. The cartel, acting as a collusive mo-
nopoly, maximizes its profits by producing the quantity which equates
marginal revenue and marginal cost.' 9 As a result of cartelization, the
price increases to the domestic monopoly price, Pdm, and quantity de-
creases to Qtjm.2 0 Consumers are even worse off than in the competi-
tive closed market. Prices are higher; Pdm will always be greater than
16 The foreign producers may or may not be willing to do this. This is a matter of
negotiating among domestic and foreign producers. It is simply one variation of the typical
problem of cartels to decide how to divide up the monopoly rents.
17 Rodriguez & Williams, supra note 5, at 224-25 (indifference curves imply substitutes).
18 Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
19 The marginal cost curve, represented by the industry supply curve, is now S'.
20 The monopolist sells the output Q, at the price represented by the demand curve.
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Figure 4
Closed Market That Is Cartelized
(Import Restrictions and Cartel;
Closed Market That Is Subsequently Cartelized)
Pd- Output is lower. Supracompetitive profits are earned by the do-
mestic producers, even above those earned in the competitive (un-
cartelized) but import restricted market. Therefore, the domestic
industry has the incentive to cartelize even when import restrictions
exist.
Case 5: Cartelized Market That Is Closed
A similar comparison can be made by beginning with the open,
but cartelized market. The domestic producers, already part of a car-
tel, would benefit from the establishment of import restrictions that
prevent foreign competitors from selling in the country.
Qdm Qd Q.
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Figure 5
Cartelized Market That Is Closed
(Import Restrictions and Cartel;
Cartelized Market That is Subsequently Closed).
Q. Q. Q, Q
In Figure 5, the cartelized industry is producing Q,, the collusive
monopoly quantity on the international supply curve S'. When imports
are restricted, the new supply curve is Sd. Because the ,cartel is still in
place-albeit with only domestic producers-the participants now
maximize profits by producing where MR intersects Sd (the new margi-
nal cost curve). The monopoly quantity now produced, Qm, is less
than Qm. Price increases from Pm to Pdm. Consumers are worse off
than they were before the import restrictions were imposed, while the
domestic industry is better off.
Let us summarize the preceding analysis. 2 1 If an industry has im-
21 For the sake of clarity, the foregoing discussion did not consider the effect of the
costs of organizing a cartel or of obtaining import restrictions. In short, our model has as-
sumed that import restrictions and cartelization can occur costlessly. This assumption im-
plies that import restrictions eliminate all foreign producers and that cartels can prevent
cheating. In reality, of course, this is not the case. Introducing transaction costs, however,
means that the industry is only likely to be partially successful in achieving these goals. Thus,
consideration of these cost factors does not change our results.
However, when costs are introduced, the firms must choose the amount of resources to
devote to these activities. Rodriguez and Williams view the problem with budget constraints
and isocost curves. Rodriguez & Williams, supra note 5, at 224. They show that when re-
sources are devoted to either forming a cartel or lobbying for import restrictions, an increase
in the cost of one of these activities results in a shift of resources to the other. This approach
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
port restrictions, it can increase its profits by cartelizing. Alternatively,
if an industry is cartelized, it can increase its profits by obtaining im-
port restrictions. An industry which successfully cartelizes and obtains
import restrictions earns greater supracompetitive profits than an in-
dustry that does only one or the other.
Although cartelization and trade restrictions both have the effect
of increasing prices to consumers, they do so by alternative means.
Cartelization decreases quantity on a given supply curve, while import
restrictions shift the supply curve inward. Rodriguez and Williams ar-
gue that efforts at either method are substitutable to the -interest
group. Instead, as we have shown, the two methods are complemen-
tary.22 Therefore, the separate effects of cartelization, which Rodri-
guez and Williams doubt, are in fact a real threat. Thus, Rodriguez
and Williams's conclusion-that preventing cartelization is not signifi-
cant-is flawed. Rather, there can be benefits from preventing carte-
lization. Increasing the cost of cartelization forces firms in the industry
to shift their time, effort, and resources towards other responses to
competition. At worst, it will shift them towards obtaining additional
import restrictions, a second-best solution for the industry. An indus-
try that cannot cartelize but can only restrict imports will charge lower
prices and earn fewer profits than an industry that can do both.
B. Casual Empiricism
Alternatively, it may be instructive to test Rodriguez and Williams's
propositions with casual empiricism. If government protection from
competition is so cheap and easy to obtain, and if it is a substitute for
cartelization, we should not observe attempted cartelization or monop-
olization behavior in the economies in question. Cartel detection
methods in Central Europe are not as advanced as they are in the
United States, but there is nonetheless some evidence of cartelization
in Central Europe. For example, Polish insurance companies, which
do not face competition from abroad, nevertheless agreed on rates.
Polish sugar companies agreed on prices. 23 Similarly, some Warsaw
is obviously true, but overly simplistic. A firm's opportunity for earning greater profits is not
limited to these two alternatives. The firm can also increase profits by lowering costs, improv-
ing productive capacity or engaging in research and development. With limited resources, it
must choose how to allocate these resources to best maximize overall profits. To maximize
profits, the firm will devote resources to all of these activities until the additional profit per
unit of marginal cost for each activity is equal. An increase in the cost of cartelization lowers
the expected profitability from this activity and consequently causes the firm to shift away
from cartelization into other profitable activities such as increased lobbying or cost-cutting
efforts or other pro-competitive responses. However, it is entirely possible that the firm may
choose not to increase its lobbying activities following an increase in the cost of cartelization.
22 Efforts to cartelize depend on whether competitive threats from imports are credible.
For example, if domestic industry producers collude to restrict output, their efforts are hin-
dered to the extent that imports can provide lower priced products to the market.
23 Przedseibiorstwo Pafistwowe Cukrownie "Janikowo" v. Urzad Antymonopolowy
Uanikowo Sugar Enterprise v. Antimonopoly Office], XVII A.M.R. 37/92 (1993).
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taxicabs formed "groups" that agreed on supracompetitive fares24 and
chased away lower priced competitors from desirable taxi stands.2 5
Why were these competitors trying to cartelize if, as Rodriguez and
Williams claim, they simply could have obtained equivalent govern-
mental protection from competition? The answer is not clear.26 But it
is clear that Rodriguez and Williams's theory fails on this account.
Another casually empirical test may be made in more developed
market economies. If trade restrictions make domestic competitors
"uninterested in cartelizing," then one should not often observe cartel
behavior in import-restricted industries. Some well-known examples
that suggest otherwise are the Japanese construction industry27 and
the European steel industry. 28 Indeed, the conventional wisdom is
that the existence of import restrictions makes cartelization more
likely, rather than less likely.2 9
In short, cartelization is a problem whether or not there are im-
port restrictions. In particular cases, it may be a larger or smaller prob-
lem than import restrictions. Whether large or small, it is a problem
that can harm consumers, and such problems deserve solutions, if solu-
tions are available. And cartelization is a problem that can be kept in
check, if not solved. The cost of a reasonable deterrence program
need not be high. Thus, antimonopoly agencies should attempt to
prevent cartelization.
H. Competition Advocacy-Is It Really Hopeless?
As noted above, import restrictions are a problem that can cause
serious harm to consumers. This is true whether or not there is carte-
lization. Can antimonopoly agencies do something about the serious
problem of government protection from competition? Rodriguez and
Williams examine the role of a "competition advocate" and find it lim-
ited. They note that administrative procedures may not provide for
such advocacy30 and that there are political and bureaucratic limita-
tions.31 They also note the "unenforceablility" of a competition advo-
24 These fares were to 150% higher than the competitive fare, at one point.
25 Personal experience of authors.
26 Several explanations are possible: (1) bureaucracies may not be efficient at imple-
menting interest groups' goals; (2) some bureaucrats may be well-motivated rather than ill-
motivated, i.e., they intend to do the right thing; (3) bureaucracies may be driven by inertia
as much as by interest groups; and (4) bureaucracies may have to contend with opposing
interest groups.
27 Compare Walled Up, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1993, at 76 (import barriers), with NEC Unit
Pays U.S. $34 Million to Settle Bid-Rigging Charges, FTC WATCH, May 20, 1991, at 10 (bid
rigging).
28 See W. GOLDBERG, AILING STEEL: THE TRANsocEANIc QUARREL 111-22 (1986).
29 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES, AND OTHER MATERALS ch. 2 (2d ed. 1981).
30 Rodriguez & Williams, supra note 5, at 230.
31 Id.
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cate's views.3 2 Their only concrete suggestion for dealing with these
problems is to define the antitrust agency's competition advocacy role
in the country's constitution, 33 but ultimately they are thoroughly pes-
simistic: 3 4 They "doubt that any nation, developing or not, has the will-
ingness or commitment necessary for such a controversial initiative."35
The sad fact is that the world of policy formation is not a perfect
place. If one's standard of success for competition advocates is
whether they win all their battles, they will always be adjudged unsuc-
cessful. A more realistic measure should be whether they are able to
pick the most important fights and to make slow progress. As articu-
lated by Anna Fornalczyk, the President of the Polish Antimonopoly
Office, a competition agency must fight within the government to min-
imize import protection, recognizing that elimination of such protec-
tion is probably not a realistic goal:
At the Antimonopoly Office, we have fought against protectionism for
over two years, and I am convinced that we must do away with protec-.
tionism if our industries are to grow strong enough to compete in the
world market. Given the current state of Poland's economy, however,
we have to temper our belief in free trade with a recognition of the
economic and social arguments for setting tariff and non-tariff barri-
ers. Thus, we have reserved our strongest objections to proposals for
adopting trade barriers that are not tied to a specific, time-limited pro-
gram to restructure the industry and then leave it to face competition
in the world market.36
Even if a competition agency has no formal powers over anticom-
petitive regulation-what Rodriguez and Williams refer to as "undevel-
oped or unknown" administrative procedures and "unenforceability"
of agency views-competition advocacy can be effective. On one occa-
sion, for example, the Polish agricultural ministry proposed a vast set
of "equalizing tariffs" for food products that would have raised the
32 Id. at 223. "[A]dvocacy programs have generally lacked enforcement powers."
33 Id. at 230.
34 Id. at 231 "We are not encouraged by past attempts at competition advocacy by gov-
ernment agencies."
35 Id. at 232.
36 Anna Fornalczyk, Competition Policy During Transformation of a Centrally Planned
Economy, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY: ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORD-
HAM CORPORATE LAw INSTITUTE 392-93 (Barry Hawk, ed., 1993). She offered a broader expla-
nation of the role of a competition advocate on another occasion:
Following our responsibilities, the Antimonopoly Office has insisted on an ex-
pansion of market forces in the economy. Very often other ministries have
treated us like a troublemaker .... For two years the Polish government has
begun many restructuring programmes for various fields of the economy.
These sectoral studies have been focused on the technical and economic as-
pects of firms' activities. First of all, these studies have been prepared to sup-
port the goals of the firms' management and employees. The majority of these
programmes has not taken the interests of competition, consumers and society
as a whole into account.... As you know very well, nobody likes competition in
his own backyard, but we should fight for implementation for competition
rules.
Anna Fornalczyk, Remarks Before Conference on the Second Anniversary of Establishment
of the Antimonopoly Office (Apr. 1992, Warsaw).
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prices of imported food, by means of complicated formulae, allegedly
to the level of the cost of Polish production for the same product. The
Antimonopoly Office had no legal authority to prevent this regulation,
or even to comment on it. But the Executive Director of the Office,
Ryszard Hoffman, gave interviews with the leading Polish newspapers
and said that the complicated equalizing tariff proposal could be sum-
marized in three short points: (1) The Minister of Agriculture is made
governor-general of all agricultural markets. (2) He will exercise this
authority in consultation with the farmers' union. (3) Consumers are
free to decide whether to eat or not.3 7 Ridicule worked, and the pro-
posal was dramatically cut back. The question for Rodriguez and Wil-
liams is whether Polish consumers are better off because there was
someone with the background, the instincts, and the platform to make
those points.
There is no question that competition advocacy can be a difficult
task. Despite their pessimism, Rodriguez and Williams make useful
suggestions for focusing and improving such efforts. But their ulti-
mate pessimistic conclusion is simply too defeatist. Competition advo-
cacy can be valuable, if the advocates have reasonable goals and
concentrate on them.
UI. Summary
Cartelization can harm consumers, whether or not there are trade
barriers. Thus, preventing cartelization is a reasonable task for a com-
petition agency. Competition advocacy, too, if not judged by an exces-
sively harsh standard, will be seen as an appropriate task for a
competition agency. Antimonopoly agencies that work toward
preventing cartelization and advocating competition can benefit con-
sumers in economies in transition.
37 See A. G4siorowski, Minister rolnictwa.na gubernatora, GAZETA WYBORCZA, Nov. 4, 1992;
M. Urbaniak, Jego Wysokoid Minister, GAZETA BANKOWA, Nov. 5, 1992; J. Paradowska, Przegld
Pasy, POLrryKA, Nov. 6, 1992.

